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RECENT DECISIONS
confronted with the evidence, was not deemed a sufficient satisfaction
of the authorization clause of the section.
Meaning has been given to what Congress has written so as to
accomplish the policy that Congress formulated. 14  It appears that
enforcement of the criminal law and the protection of rights of privacy
granted by the Constitution have been harmoniously fused.
A. B.
GIFTs CAUSA MORTIS-TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION AS AFFECT-
ING WIDOWS' STATUTORY RIGHT.-Administrator of deceased seeks
to have a trust declared with respect to a sum given by decedent to
the defendant, his brother, shortly before the decedent's death, con-
tending said transaction to be a gift causa nwrtis 1 and as such is tes-
tamentary in character and must be subject to rights which the law
grants to widows.2  The evidence established that deceased having
become so ill that "death could be expected at any time" gave said
gift, the sum of two thousand dollars, to defendant "so that he could
have it in case anything happened". Defendant maintains that said
14 "Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders go
unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed incon-
sistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." Nardone v.
United States, 302 U. S. 379, 383, 58 Sup. Ct. 275, 277 (1937).
1 Donatio morlis causa is defined as: "A gift made by a person in sickness,
who apprehending his dissolution near, delivers, or causes to be delivered, to
another the possession of any personal goods, to keep as his own in case of
donor's decease. 2 BL. Comm. 514. The civil law defines it to be a gift under
apprehension of death; as when anything is given upon condition that, if the
donor dies, the donee shall possess it absolutely, or return it if the donee should
survive or should repent having made the gift, or if the donee should die before
the donor." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 612. In Gymes v. Hone,
49 N. Y. 17, 20 (1892), the court in defining gifts causa vnortis said: "Three
things are necessary. 1. It must be made with a view to donor's death. 2. The
donor must die of that ailment or peril. 3. There must be a delivery." Where
donor feared death from an operation but died from a heart attack the court
held that a valid gift causa mortis was created despite the fact that donor died
from a different ailment or peril. Redden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 26 N. E.
627 (1890).
A gift causa inortis where donor took his own life was held invalid as
against public policy. Bainbridge v. Hoes, 163 App. Div. 870, 149 N. Y. Supp.
20 (2d Dept. 1914).
2 It is fundamental that the law always seeks to provide for a widow from
the estate of her deceased husband. Today this tendency is strongly evidenced
by the New York statutes in relation thereto. See N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW §§ 18, 83. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18 amounts in effect to a statu-
tory limitation on the power of an owner to direct the mode of distribution of
his net estate subsequent to his death, and renders invalid as to a surviving
spouse, at his or her election, a will, which is executed after the effective date of
this section, and which fails to make the specified minimum provision for his or
her benefit. In re Lavine's Will, 167 Misc. 879, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 923 (1938).
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transaction was an executed gift inter vivos 3 unaffected by the statu-
tory rights of the widow. Held, complaint dismissed. Though a
widow's claim is valid as against a gift causa mortis,4 (which is in
certain respects substantially similar to a testamentary gift), this is
so, only, where estate is insufficient to meet widow's claim; where
there is sufficient funds to uphold gift and satisfy wife's claim no
cause of action is stated. Railey v. Railey, 30 F. Supp. 121 (D. C.
D. of C. 1939).
In New York, an owner of property can alienate his property
as he pleases unless it amounts to a fraud upon creditors.5 Where
the question of a transfer in fraud of a widow's statutory rights are
involved "the test is essentially whether the husband has in good faith
divested himself of ownership" 6 and "the good faith required of the
donor in making a valid disposition of his property during his life
does not refer to the purpose to affect his wife but to the intent to
divest himself of ownership of the property." 7 Hence in dealing with
a trust created in an alleged attempt to evade a wife's statutory privi-
leges, the court in Newn v. Dore 8 concluded that the trust agree-
ment executed by a husband, three days before his death, reserving
the right to income during his life, the right to revoke at will and
the-retention of entire control over the trustees was sufficient to show
a transfer in bad faith on the theory that the husband never divested
himself of ownership and the transfer was merely illusory.
In problems concerning gifts causa mortis is the question of good
faith to be considered or are they per se to be treated as testamentary
dispositions? In Baker v. Smith,9 the New Hampshire court, in ac-
cepting the majority view, after stating that a married woman could
not deprive her husband of his statutory rights by will, said, "and
what she cannot do in this respect by will she cannot do by another
form of testamentary disposition through donatie causa mortis, which
is of the nature of a legacy, and becomes a valid gift only upon the
3 A gift inter vivos is defined as: "Between the living, from one living
person to another. Where property passes by conveyance the transaction is
said to be inter vivos, to distinguish it from a case of succession or devise. So
an ordinary gift from one person to another is called a 'gift inter vivos', to
distinguish it from a donation made in contemplation of death (mortis causa)."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 994.
4 Facts establishing that decedent lived frugally and that his gifts up until
his last illness to his brother were very modest ones, it is clear that the gift
complained of was intended by decedent that it should be irrevocable only in
case of his death. Instant case at 123.
5 In re Clark's Estate, 149 Mis:. 374, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1933). In
Redden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 579, 26 N. E. 627, 629 (1891), the court said:
"Gifts 'causa mortis' as well as gifts inter vivos are based upon the fundamental
right everyone has of disposing of his property as he wills."
6 Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 379, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 969 (1937).
7 Ibid.
8 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937).
9 66 N. H. 422, 23 Atl. 82 (1891).
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decease of the donor." 10 Thus the weight of authority 11 seems to
follow the instant case in treating a gift causa mwrtis as a testamen-
tary disposition and, consequently, subject to the statutory rights of
a widow. New York, by way of a surrogate's decision,' 2 has fallen
out of line with said view when the court said, "The courts in the past
have confirmed the right of a spouse to transfer property, free from
the claim of a husband or wife, in many ways, among others by gift
inter vivos, or gift causa mortis * * * and the rights of a surviving
spouse are not increased * * * to include a right to an interest in
property transfered other than by will, it follows that any such trans-
fer, either effective in life, or at the instant of death, other than by
will can still be made, free from any right of a surviving spouse to
any interest trafisferred." 1
The power of revocation only, being reserved in a gift causa
mortis, it is believed that the test of good faith as laid down by the
court in Newnman v. Dore 14 is not violated and that such gifts should
be considered -as a mode of alienation inter vivos and not as a testa-
mentary disposition. The legislature has been quick to regulate the
formalities-requisite to any form of testamentary disposition and, the
fact that a gift causa mortis can be created without the slightest for-
mality is strong evidence that the legislature never intended that they
be treated as such.
B.L.
INCOME TAX---DEDUCTIBILITY OF Loss TO SOLE STOCKHOLDER
ON TRANSFER TO CONTROLLED CORPORATION.-On December 29,
1932, the plaintiff, sole shareholder, who, dominated and" controlled
the Innisfail Corporation through his subordinates, the directors and
officers, sold certain securities at market value to the corporation
causing himself to suffer a loss with the intent of deducting this loss
in the computation of his taxable net income for that year. The
plaintiff, thereafter, carried out his plan. On March, 11,, 1935, the
0 bid.
11 See Note (1929) 64 A. L. R. 485.
12 In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1933). See
In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1935), aff'd, 248
App. Div. 697, 289 N. Y. Supp. 818 (1st Dept. 1936).
3. In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374, 376, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253, 255 (1933).
14275 N. Y.. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937); Krause v. Krause, 171 Misc.
355, 358, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 812, 813 (1939) ("Since § 18 of the Decedent Estate
Law went into effect (1930) and since the decision in Newman v. Dore (1937)
I believe it to be now the general rule in New York State that a husband in his
lifetime may lawfully dispose of his property, real or personal, by sale, transfer,
trust agreement or gift-with or without an intent to deprive his wife of prop-
erty rights after his death-if the husband's interest in the property which is
transferred be transferred, inter vivos, eo instanti and fully").
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